Beyond Governance: Understanding Corruption Opportunities and Networks in China’s BRI Projects in Central Asia by Cooley, Alexander A.
11/18/21, 10:54 AMBeyond Governance: Understanding Corruption Opportunities and Netwo…s BRI Projects in Central Asia - Belt & Road in Global Perspective
Page 1 of 8https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/beltandroad/article/beyond-governance-u…on-opportunities-and-networks-in-chinas-bri-projects-in-central-asia/
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
→ Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy: Belt & Road in Global Perspective
← Back to the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Belt & Road in Global Perspective
at the Munk School of Global A!airs & Public Policy
NAVIGATION
TRANSFORMATIONS: DOWNSTREAM
EFFECTS OF THE BRI
NEXT  PREV BACK
Beyond Governance: Understanding
Corruption Opportunities and Networks
in China’s BRI Projects in Central Asia
February 12, 2021
11/18/21, 10:54 AMBeyond Governance: Understanding Corruption Opportunities and Netwo…s BRI Projects in Central Asia - Belt & Road in Global Perspective
Page 2 of 8https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/beltandroad/article/beyond-governance-u…on-opportunities-and-networks-in-chinas-bri-projects-in-central-asia/
Author: Alexander Cooley (Columbia University)
One of the emerging memes of China’s Belt and Road Initiative’s possible impact is a
concern about the potential to fuel corruption in partnering countries. O!en phrased as
“governance problems,” critics speculate that substantial investments in large-scale
infrastructure projects– such as road-building, railways, pipelines and power generation
plants- may "ood BRI partner countries with loans and investments that they are unable
to absorb and might fuel local bribe-taking and gra!. Critics of the BRI frequently
underscore China’s policy of “non-interference“ in the domestic matters of their partners,
under which Chinese aid and investment is allegedly not subjected to the same type of
oversight and conditionality as so-called Western aid.  In response, defenders of the BRI
rightly point out that most infrastructure projects, regardless of nationality of the donor,
are subject to governance concerns, while others concede that even if the BRI enables
some corruption, the overall developmental bene#ts of completing necessary
infrastructure projects will surely outweigh any potential corruption-related losses.
But what exactly do we mean when we say “corruption” or “poor governance”?  What are
the range of behaviors that implicate local actors and politicians and how might they feed
broader bilateral ties and the political economy of the BRI? And how might we better
analytically understand the types of local and regional political networks that are being
spurred by the BRI?
Drawing upon cases of recently completed Chinese infrastructure projects in Central Asia,
I propose to unpack the issue of corruption, outline the broader transnational context in
which corruption networks operate, and explore what the mechanisms of accountability
reveal about a partner country’s formal and informal political dynamics.
Project Phases and Varying Forms of Corruption
First, we need to distinguish what, exactly, we mean by “corruption.” The standard
de#nition, when referring to government actors, is the abuse of public o$ce for private
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gain. The de#nition includes more than bribery to include embezzlement, cronyism,
extortion, fraud, kickbacks, gra! and nepotism. Scholars and anti-corruption watchdogs
usually distinguish between “grand corruption,” which take place at the highest tiers of
government and involves major transactions versus “petty” or administrative corruption,
which usually refers to everyday forms of corruption that citizens face when engaging
with government institutions.
One way to distinguish between di%erent forms of grand corruption in BRI projects is to
disaggregate possible corrupt behaviors by project’s phase or sequence. At the beginning
of a project, an obvious point for possible corruption is the awarding of a contact. All
countries maintain procurement policies that regulate and guide how contracts involving
public resources—including foreign donor funded ones—should be awarded. For
example, consider the infamous case of the Chinese company TBEA, which was awarded a
contract to refurbish a powerplant in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, but failed and le! much of the
Kyrgyz capital without power and heat in the winter of 2018. According to a commission
investigation, the company won the $400 million contract despite the fact that other
competitors, including an experienced Russian #rm, had submitted lower cost bids.
Former Kyrgyz Prime Minister Sapar Isakov was subsequently tried and convicted for
rigging the TBEA contract. Similarly, just a few years before, former Kyrgyz Prime
Minister Temir Sariyev resigned in April 2016 a!er being accused of illegally awarding a
$100 million highway contract to a Chinese #rm.
But while the tender process is perhaps the most obvious point of potential bribery,
subsequent stages of the construction process itself also o%er opportunities for collusion
and gra!. This is especially a danger in a large-scale construction project, where sourcing
and subawards can hold lucrative opportunities for kickbacks and embezzlement.
Consider the recent revelations by the Financial Times about an elaborate scheme in the
construction of the China-Central Asia gas pipeline, perhaps the signature Chinese
investment in Central Asia which, a!er opening in 2009, provided a regional network to
source gas from Central Asia and deliver it to Western China. The FT investigation
revealed a sourcing kickback scheme that was designed to funnel the excess pro#ts from
over-in"ated costs of physical pipeline construction to a powerful family member of the
former President of Kazakhstan. According to documents, the scheme itself involved an
intermediary company, which agreed to buy steel from a Chinese steel source and then
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resell it to a pipeline construction company, with 70% of the mark-up pro#t being
funnelled to the Kazakh o$cial.
Once built, the operation of an infrastructure project o%ers opportunities for both the
rent-seeking project and its regulatory-related corruption. Although usually considered
“public goods,” infrastructure projects like highways and railways can provide additional
opportunism for private pro#t-making to connected insiders. Consider the telling
example of the Dushanbe-Chanak highway, completed in Tajikistan in 2010. The project
was built by the China Road and bridge Corporation and mostly #nanced by a $280
Chinese state loans. However, just weeks a!er its completion, tollbooths appeared on the
highway, operated by a previously unknown company–Innovative Road Solution–
registered in the British virgin Islands with no corporate history, which was later traced to
a member of the Presidential family. Although the government claimed that the tolls were
intended to pay back the Chinese loan, the company insisted it was only responsible for
road maintenance while a local economist estimated the tolls generated $49 million
annually in opaque revenues   Beyond operational revenues, once completed, the
operations of large-scale infrastructures also demand regulation and oversight, which can
also a%ord opportunities for bribery and gra!.
Regional and Transnational Networks of Corruption
A second analytical lesson to keep in mind is that although we o%er think of corruption as
a domestic phenomenon, grand corruption seldom takes place solely within the legal
boundaries of a single state or even within the bilateral relationship between China and its
partners. True, there are several ways in which governance issues can complicate the
bilateral relationship, including implicating Chinese actors in domestic political
corruption and in"uence peddling, ballooning a country’s debt, and using BRI partnership
to in"uence other aspects of a partner’s foreign policy such as UN votes or expressions of
disapproval about sensitive matters to Beijing such as its human rights practices, the status
of Taiwan or its policies towards its Western province of Xinjiang.
However, our cases instructively show that even these cases of Chinese-related corruption
are nested in much broader regional and transnational dynamics. As John Heathershaw
and I have explored, perceptions that Central Asia is somehow isolated or Central Asian
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economies are somehow closed belie the reality that elites and o$cials have been globally
and regionally connected through informal corruption networks.
For example, returning to the Kazakh pipeline case, the project was originally #nanced by
Chinese loans for an estimated $10.5bn. However, the key role played in the steel kickback
scheme appears to have involved a Singaporean-registered company, ETK, owned by a
Russian national. ETK was the intermediary that purchased steel from the Chinese
manufacturer Jiangsu Shagang at $935 a tonne and resold it to the Russian pipeline
manufacturer TMK for $1,500 a tonne, thus netting a $75 million pro#t for the
intermediary. Contra much geopolitically-framed coverage at the time that China had
outcompeted Russia by constructing this pipeline as an alternative to the old-Soviet
network used by state giant Gazprom, the payo% scheme reveals a complex regional
network of interests that appeared to have been molli#ed by the Chinese-funded project.
More broadly, the use of o%shore-registered anonymous shell companies as
intermediaries for corrupt schemes has been a standard feature of Central Asian grand
corruption networks. In his groundbreaking work Global Shell Games, political scientist
Jason Sharman and his colleagues simulated thousands of solicitations to global providers
of shell companies under #ctitious Central Asian names to see if these providers would
sell to potential clients who displayed high risk of corruption without proper veri#cation
of their identities and residence. As he showed, and as we further explored in our
examination of Central Asia’s transnational corruption networks, company service
providers from the US and the UK were especially non-compliant with global
transparency standards. Moreover, global anti-kleptocracy e%orts are increasingly
highlighting the role played by professionals service providers–including lawyers,
accountants, wealth managers, real estate brokers and bankers—who, through selling legal
services, help to create the legal instruments that facilitate the underlying transactions
from corrupt activities, maintain their clients’ con#dentiality, and repurpose them into
acceptable personal assets, usually deposited in the West or other jurisdictions where
personal property is guaranteed. Indeed, even a!er a corruption scandal breaks,
professional public relations crisis managers vigorously deny allegations on behalf of their
clients and initiate legal action with media outlets to try and stem publications.
The Politics of Anti-Corruption and Accountability
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A third important issue raised by focusing on BRI-related corruption in Central Asia is
how exactly grand corruption schemes are exposed and documented. As is well-known,
barring Kyrgyzstan, the Central Asian states are authoritarian polities with deep networks
of informal and patrimonial politics. Exposing corruption schemes o!en involves
exposing the activities of the most privileged and powerful elites in these countries. Yet,
we still see an important role played by civil society– especially in Kyrgyzstan– as well as
the independent media outlets. As Laruelle and Peyrouse have noted in their study of
Central Asian attitudes towards China, Chinese-related corruption stories and
investigations appear broadly permissible in the Central Asian media environment, if only
to play upon the meme that China is actively corrupting state and local government
o$cials. One rarely sees similar exposés of Russian-related schemes or scandals.
At the same time, a corollary of most grand corruption networks operating at the
transnational level is that various global aspects of these networks can be exposed and
investigated by global journalists and regulators. For example, the scandals that implicated
Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of Uzbekistan’s former President Islam Karimov, and her
associates in a series of money laundering and kickback schemes involving three
international communications companies– all of which substantial settlements with the
US Department of Justice for violating their Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Accused of
taking $885 million in bribes by US authorities, Karimova’s telecom dealings were
originally exposed by a Swedish news investigation into the pay-to-play activities of the
Scandinavian telecommunications company Teliasonera (now Telia). Eventually, the
Swedish journalists with Finnish and US counterparts exposed the massive bribery
scheme that led to Karimova’s political downfall and house arrest in Uzbekistan.
International investigative consortia like the OCCRP, which actively network local and
international journalists, have been at the forefront of investigating and exposing grand
corruption schemes in Central Asia.
But perhaps the most analytically interesting vehicle for revealing corruption has been the
insider information provided by opposition politicians in exile. Much of the information
obtained by the FT about the pipeline scandal was reportedly provided by Aisultan
Nazarbayev, grandson of former President Nazarbayev, whose father Rakhat Aliyev, who
became a #erce regime critic before he was found dead in 2015 in an Austrian prison
while awaiting extradition back to Kazakhstan. Aisultan reportedly described some of the
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corruptions schemes in the Central Asian oil and gas sectors to the FT before he was
found dead in London in August 2020 (autopsy determined the cause of death was
cocaine toxicity).  Similarly, a prior scandal that detailed how Chinese state oil giant CNPC
had rigged a tender to acquire Kazakhstan’s Aktobe Munaigaz in 2003- as detailed in
the–Wall Street Journal– was triggered by open letters and documents provided by
Mukhtar Ablyazov, Kazakhstan’s most wanted fugitive who now has secured political
asylum in France. More broadly, allegations of corruption are frequently both levelled at
prominent political exiles and made by them as a way of battling over political legitimacy,
image-making and global reputation-laundering. In other words, as scholars and analysts,
we need to be as aware of the messengers who deliver important exposes of grand
corruption and situate them in the political context– domestic and external– of their
particular countries.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, this brief dive into Central Asia’s corruption dynamics also suggests
that even in BRI-related issue area and projects, Chinese actors may not be able to control
or even in"uence the local political actors and networks in which their infrastructure
investments are embedded. When faced with allegations that the BRI promoted
corruption and poor governance, Chinese o$cials and analysts o!en reject allegations,
downplay the scale of these problems, and even blame scandals on messengers such as the
Western media or NGOs. But, as recent experiences in Central Asia suggests, corruption
allegations against Chinese-funded projects are as likely to be part of the political
landscape for some time.  It is imperative that we provide more nuanced assessments of
these schemes and networks.
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